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Section: CRUNS Comment

Methanol’s continuing rise

While demand for ammonia remains – for now at least – strongly tied to fertilizer and farming, over the three decades that I’ve edited this publication, methanol’s story has been a very different one, with a succession of major new slices of demand coming every few years from new applications that flare up and then mature or even drop away again. For a while in the 1990s it was MTBE, the oxygenated fuel additive that had a brief flourish in the US before being shut down by leaking fuel tanks leaching into ground water. Then there was dimethyl ether (DME) as a blendstock for LPG, and methanol itself directly blended into gasoline in China to keep up with soaring vehicle fuel demand. More recently, methanol to olefins (MTO) has added almost another 25% of demand over and above existing chemical and fuel uses. But as the world cracks down on coal production and use, China’s attempt to use methanol as a way of using domestic coal to replace imported oil seems to have passed its high water mark and begun to recede.

Black Sea deal in danger

Last year, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the associated disruption to fertilizer and grain exports from both countries, there were dire predictions of the impact upon global food supply. That the worst of these predictions have not so far come to pass is in no small part due to the deal brokered by the United Nations and Turkey in July 2022 to allow exports of grain and fertilizers from Black Sea ports. According to the UN, since last July, some 29.5 million tonnes of grain and foodstuffs have been exported from Ukraine via the Black Sea, including nearly 600,000 tonnes in World Food Programme vessels for aid operations in Afghanistan Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen. Before the war, Ukrainian grain fed the equivalent of up to 400 million people worldwide, and the deal ensured that Ukrainian grain exports ‘only’ fell by 5 million t/a over the past year.

Which way the wind blows

On March 20th this year, just as this issue was going to print, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued its Synthesis Report, one of its 5-7 yearly comprehensive assessments of how the world’s climate is changing and what needs to be done to ameliorate it. In spite of all of the progress that has been made since the 5th Synthesis Report in 2017, the IPCC notes that: “the pace and scale of what has been done so far, and current plans, are insufficient to tackle climate change.” While the body believes that keeping warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is still possible, it is not likely unless work to decarbonise proceeds more rapidly. In particular, the IPCC suggests that CO2 and equivalent emissions need to fall by 43% by 2030 compared with 2019 values, and 60% by 2035 to achieve this goal.

The politics of ammonia

Fertilizers are always political to some extent, sitting as they do at the intersection of key commodities such as oil and gas on the one hand and food on the other. Markets for major nitrogen derivatives have often been distorted by political decisions to achieve self-sufficiency in fertilizer production, such as in, e.g. China or India. But over the past couple of months ammonia has found itself particularly in the political spotlight, in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which continues to shape and indeed re-shape global commodity markets.

Winter is coming

As we near the end of the third quarter of 2022, the attention of the nitrogen industry is focused on the coming northern hemisphere winter, and the prospects for higher natural gas prices as temperatures fall and power and heating demands rise. Vladimir Putin has been stoking these worries to try and force a climbdown from European countries over the sanctions that followed his invasion of Ukraine, with the flow of gas through the Nordstream 1 pipeline across the Baltic Sea gradually dwindling over the summer and finally stopping altogether at the end of August due to “technical issues” – an explanation somewhat undermined by the subsequent statement from spokesman Dmitry Peskov that gas would flow again once sanctions were eased. This is a familiar enough tactic; Russia has used gas stoppages to pressure Ukraine and Europe several times over the past two decades.

Turning points

On February 27th, in a speech to the Bundestag, Germany’s chancellor Olaf Scholz described the events then unfolding as a “zeitenwende” – a historical turning point. He was speaking of German foreign and security policy, but it seems likely that Russia’s February 24th invasion of Ukraine may end up marking a break with the past in many different ways. Last issue’s Editorial was written when Russia’s ‘special military operation’ was still only a few days old, and the situation was still very fluid. Two months on, and for all of the uncertainties remaining, some glimpses of the way that things are changing are becoming clearer.

War returns to Europe

Late February saw the diplomatic crisis between Russia and Ukraine abruptly devolve into all-out war, on a scale not seen in Europe since the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s – some would argue not since the end of the Second World War. At time of writing, the conflict is still barely two weeks old, but has already produced an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe, and a refugee crisis of massive proportions. But over the medium and longer term, together with the international sanctions that have swiftly followed, it also has the power to deliver an economic shock to commodities markets in particular and the world economy in general that may be as bad if not worse than the crash of 2008-9.

Hype and reality

As a quick glance through the Index of last year’s articles and news items in this issue of the magazine will amply demonstrate, 2021 was a year full of project announcements for low carbon ammonia and methanol projects of all hues; blue, green, turquoise and many other shades besides. Market analysts CRU said in December that they calculated that there have been a total of 124 million t/a of low carbon ammonia projects announced, 80 million t/a of which came in 2021 alone, equivalent to 55% of current ammonia capacity. These range from tentative pilot plants that are fully costed and often with government grants already secured to blue sky visions of vast electrolysis hubs in the deserts of Arabia with timescales towards the end of the decade – it’s often the case that the longer the proposed timescale, the less likely a project is to happen.