EU Executive VP Séjourné advocates ‘Made in Europe' preference for strategic sectors

“Whenever European public funds are used, they must contribute to European production and to high-quality jobs,” Séjourné wrote. Firms bidding for public tenders, state aid, or other financial support—including foreign direct investment incentives—would need to commit significant production to EU territory. This would establish “a genuine European preference in our most strategically important industries.” This was presented in the op‑ed as a policy proposal rather than an adopted Commission text.

Séjourné likened the proposal to other countries’ industrial‑preference programmes – for example, ‘Buy American’ in the United States and ‘Made in China’ in China. Media reporting highlighted German signatories, including Dr. Markus Heyn (Robert Bosch) and Dr. Marie Jaroni (thyssenkrupp Steel Europe); other outlets also listed names such as Michael Brecht (Daimler Truck works council) among the broader set of signatories.

The op‑ed was published ahead of an informal EU leaders’ retreat scheduled for 12 February 2026 and convened by European Council President António Costa. In his invitation letter Costa framed the meeting as a debate on how to strengthen the Single Market in a changed geoeconomic context — explicitly flagging issues such as trade imbalances and strategic dependencies — and he asked EU leaders to consider how best to “protect our companies from unfair competition.”

Fertiliser production is vital for EU food security but remains heavily import‑dependent, making it vulnerable to energy costs and supply disruptions. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive period on 1 January 2026; under the rules, importers must account for embedded emissions of covered imports from 2026 and will be required to surrender CBAM certificates for 2026 imports at the first surrender deadline in 2027. That mechanism can raise the landed cost of high‑emission imports, depending on the emissions default applied and the EU ETS price used to value certificates

Paired with a funding rule that favours EU production, CBAM could shift procurement and investment decisions toward domestic, lower‑carbon fertiliser projects — reducing supply risk for critical inputs such as ammonia while potentially raising input costs in the short term as new capacity is built.

Funding and eligibility

Séjourné’s proposal would reach across the Commission’s state‑aid toolbox — from long‑running strategic instruments such as Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) (which enable cross‑border support for major industrial projects) to ad‑hoc crisis measures. If adopted, a European‑preference requirement could change eligibility criteria for both kinds of support. If adopted, a European‑preference requirement could change eligibility criteria for both kinds of support by adding localisation or production‑share conditions to grant agreements, procurement specifications and State‑aid approval letters, and by linking disbursements to milestones with monitoring and clawback provisions.

For context, the Commission approved roughly €3.5 billion in agriculture‑specific crisis‑aid schemes between March and September 2022, of which €855 million was earmarked for farmers’ fertiliser purchases — illustrating the scale at which public funds have been deployed in the sector.

Simply put, the plan could require companies applying for EU funding — whether under IPCEIs or short‑term crisis aid approved by the European Commission — to prove they will do a minimum share of the funded production, hiring or investment inside the EU, with payments tied to milestones and clawbacks if they fail to deliver.

Such eligibility rules would need careful legal design to comply with EU State‑aid rules, internal‑market non‑discrimination principles and international trade obligations, and to limit unintended price impacts for downstream users.

Market effects

If a European preference in procurement were adopted, it could tilt agricultural and infrastructure tenders toward EU‑based producers (for example, Yara). The effect on any individual company would depend on the location and ownership of its European assets and on how eligibility thresholds and transitional measures are calibrated.